This book describes the classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, as well as critiques thereof and alternative theories. It focuses on the meaning of probability, discussing some definitions and surveying their scope of applicability. The behavioral definition of subjective probability serves as a way to present the classical theories, culminating in Savage's theorem. The limitations of this result as a definition of probability lead to two directions -first, similar behavioral definitions of more general theories, such as nonadditive probabilities and multiple priors, and second, cognitive derivations based on case-based techniques.
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Preface
This book comprises lecture notes for a graduate-level class in decision under uncertainty. After teaching such classes for many years, it became more difficult to squeeze all the material into class discussions, and I was not quite sure about the appropriate order in which the issues should be presented. Trying to put everything in writing, and thereby finding at least one permutation of topics that makes sense, is supposed to help me forget less and confuse the students less. As a by-product, the notes may be useful to students who miss classes or who wish to know what the course is about without having to show up every week. The graduate classes I normally teach are geared toward students who want to do research in economics and related fields. It is assumed that they have taken a basic microeconomic sequence at the graduate level. In teaching the class, I hope that I can convince some students that decision theory is a beautiful topic and that this is what they want to do when they grow up. But I'm fully aware of the fact that this is not going to be the case for the majority of the students. I therefore attempt to teach the course with a much more general audience in mind, focusing on the way decision theory may affect the research done in economics at large, as well as in finance, political science, and other fellow disciplines.
The present notes contain relatively few proofs. Interested students are referred to books and papers that contain more details. The focus here is on conceptual issues, regarding which I find that each teacher has his or her own interpretation and style. The mathematical results are a bit like musical notesthey are written, saved, and can be consulted according to need. By contrast, our presentation and interpretation of the results are akin to the performance of a musical piece. My focus here is mostly on the interpretation I like, on how I would like to perform the theory, as it were. I comment on proofs mostly when I feel that some intuition may be gained from them and that it's important to highlight it.
These notes are not presented as original thoughts or a research paper. Many of the ideas presented here appeared in print. Some are very old, some are newer, and some appeared in works that I have coauthored. where credit is due, but I must have missed many references, of which I may or may not have been aware. The discussion also includes other thoughts that have not appeared in print and that originated in discussions with various people, in particular with David Schmeidler. When I recall precisely that a certain idea was suggested to me by someone, I do mention it, but there are many ideas for which I can recall no obvious source. This doesn't mean that they are original, and I apologize for any unintentional plagiarism. At the same time, there are also many ideas here that I know to be peculiar to me (and some to David and to me). I try to warn the reader when I present something that I know many colleagues would dismiss as complete nonsense, but, again, there must be incidences in which I was not aware that such a warning was due, and I apologize for such omissions as well. I enjoyed and was enriched by comments and references provided by many colleagues. Peter Wakker has been, as always, a fantastic source of knowledge and critique. Nicolas Vieille also made extremely detailed and insightful comments. I learned a lot from comments by Daniel Algom, Massimo Marinacci, and Teddy Seidenfeld on particular issues. The final version also benefited greatly from the detailed comments of Edi Karni, George Mailath, Marion Oury, and two anonymous reviewers. Doron Ravid and Arik Roginsky were of great help in the final stages of the preparation of the manuscript. I am very grateful to all these colleagues for their input.
